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A VERY GRADUAL SUPPRESSION: A HISTORY OF TURKISH OPIUM CONTROLS, 1933-1974
Until 1971 Turkey was one of the world's largest sources of illicit opium. A small number of studies have investigated the original 1971 Turkish opium ban (Murphy and Steele 1971; Robins 2007; Spain 1975; West 1992 ) and the control of licit opium poppy cultivation administered after 1974 (Mansfield, 2001; Windle, under consideration) . Little attention has, however, been given to opium control policies administered by Turkey between 1933 and . This article reconsiders post-1974 Turkish opium controls as the latter end of a period of gradual policy improvement.
While pre-1971 policies were largely ineffective, they offer important lessons for contemporary counter-narcotic strategies. They highlight the importance of, not only maintaining state control over opium producing areas, but also the ineffectiveness of state controls over licit production centred upon laissez faire controls and poor state procurement practices. These policies were not, however, in vain.
They were part of a period of organisational learning whereby principle actors in Turkish state institutions changed their policies in response to information and experiences about the effectiveness of controls over opium production. This led to the establishment of a highly successful control policy.
A secondary finding of this paper, revealed whilst analysing diversion 1 estimates reported during the 1960s and early-1970s, is that there may be inaccuracies in established assumptions about geographical displacement from Turkey. It is suggested that the Turkish opium ban of 1971 had either minimal impact on global or regional production levels, or that displacement occurred during the 1960s rather than the mid-1970.
This paper begins with an introduction to organisational learning theory before presenting a brief history of opium production and trade in Turkey. This is followed by a discussion on how successive
Turkish governments administered gradually more effective controls over opium cultivation and production. While gaps exist in our knowledge of how pre-1971 controls were enforced, this article goes some way towards rectifying a blind-spot in the history of international drug policy. Levitte and March (1988; also Kenney 2009 ) have defined organisational learning as the process by which an organisations routines and practices change as a result of past experiences. Individuals gain experiences through doing their job. These experiences incrementally add to an organisations collective memory (Kenney, 2009) . While direct experience is often the 'most relevant form of knowledge' (Zarkin 2010: 31) (Zarkin 2010) .
Organisational learning
What is witnessed in the present case study is a slow adaption of an entrenched policy in which state employees and external actors identified weaknesses and strengths until reaching a tipping point in the early-1970s, whereby external agencies demanded radical change. At this point Turkey was able to access accumulated knowledge to develop an effective policy. That the intervention was a gradual process is not unusual for there 'is considerable evidence that organizations often change through a sequence of small, frequent changes and inferences formed from experience with them' (Levitte and March 1988:334; Zarkin 2010) . With the theoretical foundation set, the following section provides a historical context to opium in Turkey.
Context: Opium in Turkey
The opium poppy has been cultivated in the Anatolian region of Turkey for millennia (Murphy and Steele 1971) . It was used for food, medicine and animal feed (Brundage and Mitchell 1977) .
Production and export, however, remained limited (Chambliss 1977) until 1805 when American merchants began exporting Turkish opium to China (Downs 1968; Spain 1975) . While China was, at the time, the world's largest market for opium, as its importation had been prohibited in 1799 trade with China was illegal (Windle 2012) . Turkish opium was also exported to Europe, North America and Persia (Evered 2011a) .
In 1828, the state monopolised production and distribution. While the monopoly intended to procure all opium for sale to private merchants (Poroy 1981) , insufficient resources limited its power and:
The sale of opium to unauthorised merchants by local officials was prevalent ...
Contraband was everywhere and smuggling proved to be insurmountable in spite of numerous edicts and repeated orders. The size of the contraband is estimated to be about one-third of legal purchases (Poroy 1981: 198) .
The monopoly lasted 11 years. In 1839, it was dissolved due to lack resources, corruption, deficient administration (Schmidt 1998) and pressure from foreign pharmaceutical companies, who sought to procure opium directly from Turkish farmers (Poroy 1981) .
In 1858, China legalised the importation of opium (Windle 2012) . Turkey responded by gradually increasing its share of the newly licit market (Newman 1989) and by 1905 had become China's primary foreign source of smokable opium, alongside Iran (Musto 1987) . Turkey also supplied opium to loosely regulated European pharmaceutical companies which manufactured and illicitly exported morphine to China and other states (Block 1989; Murn 1914) .
By the 1930s, Turkey had become the world's primary source of opium to both the licit and quasilicit pharmaceutical industry; accounting for 226 metric tonnes of the total 390 metric tonne global supply of opium (Eisenlohr 1934; see Block 1989; Schmidt 1998) . While opium was Turkey's fifth most important agricultural export, state control remained limited and diversion high (Eisenlohr 1934 ).
In 1925 and 1931, two international treaties were passed obliging states to regulate pharmaceutical industries to prevent the sale of opiates (i.e. morphine, heroin) for non-medical/scientific consumption (Bayer and Ghodse 1999) . As European nations gradually strengthened controls, several pharmaceutical companies relocated to Turkey to circumvent regulations and continue manufacturing opiates for non-medical/scientific consumption (Block 1989; Eisenlohr 1934; Times 1931 (Block 1989; see Meyer and Parssinen 2002) . Increased demand from foreign and domestic opiate manufacturers inflated Turkish opium production (Eisenlohr 1934 ) from already significant levels.
The beginning of laissez faire control: 1933-1960s
After would be required to yield a predetermined quantity and granted provinces permission to produce opium. Farmers in designated provinces informed their Muhtar (village leader) of their expected yield. Self-estimations were relayed to the Ministry of Agriculture and farmers were expected to adhere to them (Akçasu 1952; Murphy and Steele 1971 ; also League of Nations 1938). All residents of designated province were permitted to produce opium without a license and, were free to possess and store unlimited quantities of opium (see Akçasu 1952; Bulletin of Narcotics 1949; CND 1944 CND , 1945 CND , 1946 CND , 1951 CND , 1955 CND , 1957 . Monitoring was conducted by the Muhtar, who informed the TMO of any contravention (CINC 1972) .
Regulatory and monitoring systems were ineffective (Akçasu 1952; Lamour and Lamberti 1974) , and TMO prices 'neither repaid [farmers] for their troubles and outlay nor gave them the profit they were entitled to expect' (League of Nations 1938: 45 see Murphy and Steele 1971) . 2 As such, the majority of farmers continued to illicitly sell a significant percentage of their opium (Akçasu 1952; Lamour and Lamberti 1974) .
Additionally, opium poppy cultivation was permitted for the harvesting of seeds in many provinces where opium production was prohibited (Bulletin of Narcotics 1950). Turkey conceded in 1968 that it was unable to administer effective controls over farmers in border areas (Greenfield and Nanby 1974; INCB 1969 INCB , 1971 ). This would suggest that the state was unable to prevent farmers from extracting opium from poppies officially grown for their seeds.
In general, rural population's only interaction with the state was with tax collectors and army conscription officers (Rustow 1967) . As late as the early-1970s many opium farmers had 'rather distant relationships with the state' (Evered 2011b: 169) . Therefore, due to the lack of control over rural areas and the laissez faire opium declaration system, drug control may have been little more than pretence.
During the 1940s state institutions had, however, 'became more effective and visible' in rural areas, this included tax collection and criminal justice institutions (Zürcher 1998: 216; Rustow 1967) .
Furthermore, by the late-1940s Turkey began administering a policy of increased agricultural production, and liberalization of trade policies, (Cecen et al. 1994) in which cheap credit was provided to farmers and the TMO paid artificially high prices for agricultural produce. The policy increased the number of tractors, hard-surfaced roads, arable land and the use of motor vehicles (Zürcher 1998: 235) . Thus opening previously hard to reach rural areas to state institutions.
The 1933 Limitations Law also forced the closure of most opiate manufacturing laboratories (Block 1989; Times 1933 Ministers refusal marked the beginning of a tense period for Turkish-American relations (Uslu, 2003) and the escalation of external pressure for change.
In summary, until the 1960s, control was limited to gradually restricting permissible production areas (see Table 1 ) to where the state possessed greatest authority and away from areas with easy export access (i.e. border areas). While the TMO declared the provincial restriction policy 'gradual and calculated', there is insufficient information on how bans were enforced. The repressive use of the military against Kurdish minorities in border provinces (Robins 1993; Zürcher 1998 ) may suggest the possibility of coercive suppression. -1960s/early-1970s (see GOA 1972 -1960s/early-1970s (see GOA , 1975 Times 1970 Times , 1971 Times , 1972 Wigg 1974) may have reduced demand for Turkish opium.
These measures, alongside the further contraction of provinces (see Table 1 ), did improve the amount surrendered to the monopoly (Turnbull 1972) . This led the League of Nations Permanent
Central Opium Board (PCOB) (1965: xxix) to note with 'approval' and 'satisfaction' that restrictions were a 'step in the right direction' (PCOB 1966: xx) . The opium declaration system, however, remained deficient:
Since yields varied from year to year, the farmer tended to understate expected yields for he was liable for prosecution if he did not deliver to the [TMO ]… the total amount of gum he had reported in his declaration. In general, little effort was made to question farmer declarations or to verify actual yield at harvest time.
Thus, this system allowed for considerable opportunity for underreporting yields (CINC 1972: A3) One former opium farmer recalled how: 'No permission slips or licenses were required; we just planted as much as we wanted -and could harvest.' The primary limitation on opium production was the labour intensity of opium gum harvesting, rather than the state (Evered 2011b: 170) . 4 Enforcement institutions tended to be inefficient, under resourced and lacked training in narcotics control (Murphy and Steele 1971; Newsday 1971) . While increased seizures by the mid-1960s (Robins 2007) were testament to improved surveillance of opium farmers (Murphy and Steele 1972) , sanctions remained minimal and deterred few (Evered 2011b ).
Furthermore, state controls over distribution were diluted by farmers being legally entitled to possess opium. This allowed farmers to store overproduced opium, which could be sold as and when (Murphy and Steele 1971) . Additionally, provincial bans were limited to the less significant producers: a review of Turkish agriculture in the late-1940s failed to report opium production as important for any province outside of the Aegean, Mediterranean, Afyon, and lakes regions (Erinç and Tucdilek 1952) . Throughout the 1960s, Afyon alone accounted for 80 percent of all opium produced in Turkey (Government of Turkey 1986). Provincial bans may, therefore, have had little impact on overall licit or illicit output.
In addition to poor controls the state provided little incentive for cooperation. The monopoly remained a 'sometimes problematic, distant, and lower-paying buyer', often paying as little as 20 percent less than black market merchants. Diverted opium was often collected directly from the farmgate, whereas the monopoly made farmers travel to market (Evered 2011b: 179) . the Turkish delegate replied that controls were stringent, the accusation was not refuted (British Foreign Office 1961) . By the mid-1960s, the American estimate had increased to 80 percent (Economist 1974; Musto 1987; Lamour and Lamberti 1974) . America never validated the estimation (Epstein 1977; Evered 2011a) and it drew complaints from the Turkish (Government of Turkey 1986) and French governments (Epstein 1977) . While 80 percent is likely an overestimate, Turkey was the predominant source of opium for heroin destined for America (McCoy 2003; Murphy and Steele 1971; Rottenberg 1968 (Epstein 1977) . The CINC was the only American organisation to confess to significant error margins in their estimate (CINC 1972) .
While the two-third estimate is the one most often cited (West 1992) , Robin (2007: fn14) suggests that it was 'bandied around' so much that it became 'conventional wisdom through repetition, without being established on any firm foundation.' This said, Newsday (1974) Frequent appearance in the illicit traffic of opium, or opium derivatives, known or presumed to have originated from Turkey has made this country a focus of international concern for a number of years. Counter-measures have not been
lacking, yet the stream of such substances has persisted and has caused much disquiet ...
Illicit production/diversion summary
Reports to the League of Nations (1938) The ban was partly motivated by increasingly aggressive pressure placed on Turkey by America.
Since the late-1950s America had been requesting that Turkey prohibit all opium. The negotiations had become progressively more coercive throughout the 1960s. All American consulates were told to bring up the 'opium issue' at every available opportunity, Turkey was informed that not prohibiting opium would harm American-Turkish relations and, there were threats of economic sanction and withdrawal of aid. Additional motivating factors included the militaries belief that leftist insurgents were profiting from the illicit opiate market and concerns that being a source of illicit opium was tarnishing Turkey's reputation as a modern state (Uslu, 2003) .
The ban was funded by US$35 million in American aid, to compensate farmers and the state for loss of earnings, and develop crop substitution programmes (Spain 1975; see Brundage and Mitchell 1977; INCB 1973; US Information Service 1971) . A further US$300,000 was agreed to procure the final opium crop and US$400,000 to pay the wages of American advisors to crop substitution projects (GOA 1975) . Newsday (1974) reported that there were no violent oppositions to the ban (although many villagers hid poppy seeds in anticipation of repeal). An American Senator, conversely, reported to Hatch (1984: 2) that 'the Turkish Army played a key role in its enforcement', indicating that enforcement included some coercion. Furthermore, many provinces were already under martial law (Sayari and Hoffman 1991) .
Not only did opium represented a significant percentage of many farmers annual income, but the ban limited access to traditionally consumed opium poppy by-products such as oil, animal-feed and fuel (Brundage and Mitchell 1977; Evered 2011a) . While all farmers were compensated for loss of earnings (some even profited) (Evered 2011b) , 'most complained' about delayed or insufficient payments (Evered 2011a: 309; see Greenfield and Nanby 1974; Spain 1975) . Furthermore, crop substitution failed to deliver alternative incomes. The unstable military regime was unable to effectively administer crop substitution projects (Brundage and Mitchell 1977; GOA 1975) . As baseline agricultural research was lacking, many new crops were unsuited to local soil and weather conditions (Government of Turkey 1986; also Time 1974; West 1992) , and the poor transport infrastructure (Newsday 1974) . These inefficiencies meant that substitute crops were often six to ten times less profitable than opium (Evered 2011a) . 6 In short, the crop substitution strategy was poorly funded and designed, and as opium was banned before farmers had access to alternative incomes, it was poorly sequenced (Chouvy 2009 ). The ban impoverished many farmers, forcing them to migrate
We were happy again'. Part of the reason was that as poppy straw farming is less labour intensive than harvesting opium gum, farmers could cultivate more poppies (depending on the permission of the state) or other crops (Evered 2011b,c) .
Discussion
While post-1971 Turkish opium control policies have received significant attention there has been limited prior analysis of controls administered between 1933 and 1971. The period between 1933 and the early-1960s was characterised by laissez faire controls centred upon the gradual restriction of permissible areas to where the state possessed greatest authority and, a flawed opium declaration system dependent upon the honesty of farmers. That farmer's would not produce more than they declared to the state, or extract opium from poppies grown for their seeds, was naive. It was equally naive to allow all residents of an area to produce opium without a license and, be free to possess and store unlimited quantities of opium.
Coupled with the lack of state presence before the 1940s, Turkey lacked any real mechanism to monitor farmers or enforce compliance. Furthermore, ineffective procurement practices provided farmers with little reward for compliance. Together, these laissez faire controls and poor procurement practices provided significant and profitably opportunities for diversion. This said, the repressive use of the military against Kurdish minorities in border provinces may suggest the possibility of coercive suppression in some Kurdish opium producing areas. This is an area which requires further investigation.
Turkish controls improved as the state extended its authority into the countryside during the 1940s.
Then, during the 1960s, the TMO improved surveillance and procurement practices; learning from earlier failures to limit diversion. The monopoly, however, remained ineffective, largely due to an inability to compete with black market traders who paid more and procured at the farm-gate.
Sanctions provided minimal risk and thus deterred few. Possibly the most important limitation remained the flawed opium declaration system. That is, while controls improved during the 1960s they remained centred upon a laissez faire model of control.
The gradual restriction of opium production areas and increases in regulatory controls before 1971 was of limited success. The 1971 opium ban was equally limited. Turkish hastiness to prevent opium production meant that crop substitution programmes were ill thought-out failures. Subsequently, the ban produced major unintended consequences for rural communities and political stability. Success was finally achieved in 1974 with a policy founded upon reducing opportunities for diversion by hardening targets, increasing formal and informal surveillance, assisting compliance through fair procurement practices, and increasing the risk of non-compliance.
The 1974 'necessary' to produce such an effective policy (Zarkin, 2010: 172) .
Organisational learning was motivated by increasing external and internal pressure to prevent diversion. By the time that Turkey prohibited the extraction of opium gum a formal and informal body of knowledge concerning 'what works', and more importantly 'what does not work', had been amassed: The end result being a highly effective control policy with few of its predecessor's weaknesses. That is, state organisations had gradually learnt that laissez faire controls, and poor procurement practices, presented farmers with significant opportunities for diversion.
Note
1 'Diversion' is the rather innocuous-sounding technical term by which drug policy refers to the theft of opium at any point along regulated production and distribution lines.
